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association could face the prospect of being unable to obtain judicial
review of department orders that adversely affect its property rights.
Considering the outcomes under the two canons of construction,
the court found that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition
for judicial review on the ground that the homeowners association
was not a "party" within the meaning of the water rights statute.
Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the trial court's
decision.
Molly Callender

WASHINGTON
Fitzpatrick v. Okanogan Cnty., 238 P.3d 1129 (Wash. 2010)
(holding that statutory immunity does not apply where the cause of
action is based solely on constitutional grounds and that the common
enemy doctrine does not bar inverse condemnation claims for
property damage caused *by water flowing through a natural
watercourse).
In 1999, Okanogan County ("County") implemented major
improvements to the Sloan-Witchert Slough Dike ("Dike") on the
Methow River ("River"). Afterwards, a Washington State Department
of Ecology hydrogeologist ("State hydrogeologist") submitted a
memorandum to the County shoreline permit coordinator, explaining
that the improvements cut off the River's natural overflow channels.
He maintained that the cut off would compress more flood flow into
the main channel and reduce that natural flood conveyance capacity
of the river.
In 2002, the River flooded and washed away a substantial portion
of private real property, including the Fitzpatrick and Sturgill's
("owners") private log cabin. The owners had built the cabin outside
the 100-year flood level. They alleged that the Dike caused the River
to change course and wash away their property. The owners filed a
complaint with the Douglas County Superior Court ("trial court")
against the County and the State of Washington ("State"). The
complaint contained claims for inverse condemnation, trespass,
negligence, and wrongful injury or waste to property. An inverse
condemnation claim is an action alleging a governmental taking or
damaging to recover the value of property that the government
appropriated in fact, with no formal exercise of the power of eminent
domain. The elements of an inverse condemnation claim include: (1)
a taking or damage (2) of private property (3) for public use (4)
without just compensation (5) by a governmental entity that has not
instituted formal proceedings.
The County and State moved for summary judgment, citing the
common enemy doctrine and statutory immunity, which the trial
court granted. On appeal, Division Three of the Washington Court
of Appeals ("court of appeals") reversed the trial court, holding that
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there were material issues of fact that precluded summary judgment
and that the County and State were not immune from the owners'
inverse condemnation claims.
Subsequently, the Washington Supreme Court ("court") granted
the County's petition for review to determine whether the owners'
inverse condemnation claim could proceed against the County and
State in light of the common enemy rule. (The common enemy rule
allows landowners to dispose of unwanted surface waters, which are
the "common enemy" that any may defend themselves against, even if
such waters subsequently harm another.) The court first addressed
whether the County and State had statutory immunity from the
owners' inverse condemnation claim pursuant to Washington law.
The court found that the Washington code provides for immunity
from liability related to county improvements for flood control.
However, the court further found that statutory immunity does not
extend to claims for damages resulting from flood control measures
when a party based the cause of action solely on a constitutional
taking claim. Because the owners based their inverse condemnation
claim solely on Article 1, section 16 of the Washington Constitution,
the court determined that the County and Sate were not entitled to
statutory immunity.
Next, the court examined whether the common enemy rule
precluded the owners' inverse condemnation claim. The County and
State. argued that the common enemy doctrine applied and that it
allowed landowners to alter the flow of surface water to the detriment
of their neighbors so long as they did not block a watercourse or
natural drain way. In contrast, the owners argued that the natural
watercourse rule applied and that it prevented interference with the
natural flow of a waterway and, therefore, did not afford common
enemy doctrine protection to parties that divert water from a natural
watercourse and damage other properties. To determine which rule
applied, the court evaluated the character of the water at issue. If
water within a natural watercourse washed away the owners' property,
the natural watercourse rule would apply; conversely, if surface water
backed up onto the owners' property and caused the damage, the
common enemy doctrine would apply.
The court noted that the only evidence presented to the trial
court on this issue was evidence that supported the owners'
argument. The owners presented that the Dike work affected the
River by cutting off natural overflow channels in the floodplain,
forcing all of the flow during the high-water event into the main
channel and onto the owners' property. A declaration from the
owners' expert, a Ph.D. in Civil Engineering-Hydraulics, and the
memorandum from the State hydrogeologist supported this
argument.
Accordingly, the court held that the common enemy doctrine did
not bar the owners' inverse condemnation claim because water
flowing through a natural waterway may have caused the damage to
their property. Therefore, the court found that a genuine iss ue of
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material fact existed, and that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment.
Finally, the County and State argued that because the work plan
did not originally contemplate the property damage nor was it a
necessary incident to the government project the owners could not
bring an inverse condemnation claim. The court determined that the
information contained in the State hydrogeologist's memorandum
effectively noticed the County and State three years prior to the high
water event that the River may, as a necessary incident to or a
consequence of the Dike improvements, flood the owners' property.
Accordingly, the court found that the record reflected a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the damage to the owners' property was
a necessary incident to the County and State's work on the Dike.
Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the appellate court
and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
KainaB. Swenson

WISCONSIN
Lake Beulah Mgmt. Dist: v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Res., 787
N.W.2d 926 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that because the Wisconsin
Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") had authority to consider
scientific evidence of adverse environmental impacts to the waters of
the State from all wells, the DNR must consider an affidavit regarding
the subject well's impacts to the waters of Lake Beulah).
In 2003, the Village of East Troy ("Village") applied for a well
permit from the DNR to add a fourth well. The proposed site of the
well was only 1.,400 feet from Lake Beulah. As part of the permitting
process, the Village prepared a report, estimating that the well would
not have adverse effects on the lake. The DNR accepted the report
and issued a permit, which was valid for two years. Soon after, the
Lake Beulah Management District ("District") petitioned for a case
before the DNR, arguing that the DNR did not comply with its duty
to protect navigable waters. The District believed the DNR had a duty
to consider independently the environmental effects before
approving the permit. The DNR originally denied the petition but
The Lake Beulah Protective and
later granted a hearing.
and allied with the District
intervened
Association
Improvement
Village
filed a motion for summary
The
"District").
the
(collectively,
disposition, which the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") granted,
stating that because the language of the statute expressly required the
DNR to consider only certain impacts, the statute excluded
considering others. The ALJ further reasoned that the District failed
to present any scientific evidence demonstrating adverse impacts on
the well.
After the District filed a petition for judicial review in the
Wisconsin District Court ("district court") of the 2003 permit, the
DNR changed its opinion, spontaneously deciding it had authority to

